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TESTINIG COlVIPETINIG THEORIES OF
JUSTIFICATION
PAUL H . ROBINSON & JOHN M . DARLEY''

Nearly every jurisdiction 's criminal law recognizes justification
defenses, defenses that exculpate a p erson whose conduct would
otherwise be criminal beccwse th e conduct is accepted or
While justification
encouraged du e to sp ecial circumstance.
defenses th emselves are nearly universal, there is much
disagreement over whether the defense is given because a person's
act avoids a greater harm, the so-called deeds theory, or because
she acts for the right reason, the so-called reasons theory. At least
part of this debate focus es upon which theory best reflects
community intuitions. In this Article, Professors Robinson and
Darley report the results of an empirical study measuring
community intuitions regarding justification defenses.
They
conclude that the deeds theo ry of justification better accords with
community views than the reasons theory. The study 's results
suggest, and the authors discuss, a refo rmulation of many aspects
of offense definitions, reforms to justification defenses, mitigations
for mistake as to a justificatio n, and reforms of jury acquittal
verdicts. Such conclusions illustrate the potential usefulness of
social science research for resolving issues disputed among
criminal law theorists, as well as for providing valuable
information to the drafters of crim.inal codes. Finally, the authors
argue that reforms arising from such empirical studies increase the
law's moral credibility, which in turn increases its long-term
effectiveness in crime control.
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A. The Unknowingly Justified Actor ..... ....... ............... ..... ............. l101
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C. The Importance of Community Views in the Formulation
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Justification defenses, such as self-defense and law enforcement
authority, are common in every jurisdiction . Th ey share the
characteristic of exculp ating a person whose conduct otherwise would
constitut e a criminal offense, because the conduct is acce pted or
encouraged given the presence of special justifying circumstances. 1
For example, a police officer 's conduct in making an arrest may
satisfy the requirements of assault, but she is free from liability if that
conduct also satisfies the requirements of the law enforcement

1. See generally PAUL H. ROBI NSON , CR I M INA L L AW 401-69 (1997) (d iscussing
justification defenses in detai l).
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justification for the use of force. A lost camper who tak es food from
another's cabin may have committed an act that sa tisfie s the elements
of th e crime of theft, but he is excul pated und er a lesser evils
justification defense if the taking is n ecessary to preve nt his starving
to death.
Justification defenses are dis tinguishabl e frorn e xcuse defen ses
in a fundamental way. Both exculpa te. but for different reasons. An
actur pleading justification claims to ha ve acted prope rly . t}wt sh e did
the right thing. An actor pleading excuse , s uch as insa nit y. duress, or
involuntary conduct , admits that vvhat sh e did \vas wro ng. but claims
that some cha racteristic or her cond ition lea ves her bl c.\m e less for the
offense.
Despite the universal recognition of justification d e fenses, there
is disagreement over the und erlying theory of the justificatory
principle, and thus the proper legal formulation of such defenses. At
the core of the d ebate about the principle is the foll owing question :
Are justification defenses given because the actor 's deed avoids a
greater harm, or because she acted for the right reason?
The deeds th eo ry of justification justifies conduct that avoids a
greater harm, and thus it is conduct that we would be happy to
tolerate under similar circumstances in th e future. Justified conduct,
under this theory, occurs when the actor has done the right deed ,
hence , the " deeds " theory of justification. The reasons th eory looks
not to the deed but to the reason for the deed. The reasons theory.
then, gives a defense when a person acts for the right rea son ,
genera lly trying to avoid a greater harm. The issue betwee n the two
theories concerns the focu s of justification.
Is the focus of
justification the nature of the deed, or the actor"s reason for acting?
The debate to date relies in large part upon legal and
philosophical arguments. 2 But frequently a third source of authority
is brought into play. Each side buttresses its arg um ents with claims
that its theory better tracks community intuitions/ a common claim
in criminal law arguments. In this Article we test those claims about
community intuitions, using policy-capturing social science research
techniques designed for such inquiries. In the process, we learn
about community views on the proper theory and formulation of
justification defenses, as well as other cr iminal law doctrines, and
2. See, e.g .. Pa ul H. Robinson , Cornpeting Th eories of Ju stification: D eeds v.
Reasons, in HAR!'d AN D CULPAB ILITY 45 , 47-49 (A .P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eels.,
1996) (citing var ious authorities) .
3. See, e.g. , GEOR GE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKI NC C Riivl!NAL LAW 556-5 7 (1978): 2
PAUL H. ROB INSON , CRiiV!INAL LAW DEFENSES§ l22( e ). at 23-27 (1984).
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I. CO MPETING THEORIES OF J USTIFI CATION
In many cases, an actor's conduct will be both obj ective ly and
subj ec ti vely justified . T he actor be lie ves his conduct avoids a greater
harm and he acts to avoid that gre ater harm , th ere by sa tisfying the:
rea so ns t heory , and his conduct does in fact avoid a greater harm .
there by satisfy ing th e deeds th eory. But in many oth e r cases , the
de eds and reasons th e ories clash one! give different resu lts. and it is
the se cases of conflict that are th e focus of thi s study.
V/here the reasons theory of justification (sometimes ca ll e d th e
" subj ective" theory) is adopted, the standard justificati on
formulation provides that "an actor is justified if he believes that the
conduct is necessary "'' to d efend against unlawful aggressio n. to mak e
an arrest, to m aintain order on the vehicle , and so on. 5 Und e r this
reasons theory, a person will get a justification defense as long as she
beli eves that the justifying circumstances exist.
Whether they
actually exist or not is irrelevant.
Und er a deeds theory (sometimes termed an "objective"
theory) , the rationale for justification is whether or not the conduct is
som ething that we are content to have the actor perform due to th e
justifying circumstances and to have others perform under similar
circumstances in the future. The test for justification is whether, on
balance, the conduct in fact avoids a net societal harm (in the
bro adest sense). An actor's reasons may be relevant to liability
und er other criminal law doctrines: A mistaken reasonable belief
that the conduct is justified may exculpate under an excuse defense; a
mista ken belief that the conduct is not justified may inculpate as an
impossible attempt offense. But an actor's reasons are not relevant
und er the deeds theory in determining whether a justification defense
is available.
This, then, is the point of dispute in the theory of justification: Is
the objectively justified nature of the deed central, as the deed s
theory would have it, or irrelevant, as the reasons theory suggests?
Most commentators have signed on in support of the reasons
theory and in opposition to the deeds theory, 6 some suggesting that

4. MOD EL PE NA L CODE§ 3.01 (1985) (e mphasis added).

5. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.01-3.11 (setting forth justification formulations).
6. See, e.g. , W AYNE R. LAFAVE & A USTIN W. SCOIT, JR ., SUB STANTIV E
CRIMI NA L L AW 685 (1986) (claimin g that in order to ha ve the benefit of justifica tion o ne
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the latter is "absurd. '' 7 unfair,~ or unduly burdensomeY (It is worth
noting that the first two of these objections are based on the moral
intuitions of the writers, coup led with their certainty that others share
their moral intuitions.) Taking the minority side, one of us has
argued that a de eds theory of justification is better for a variety of
reasons , including that it generates liability results that are more just
and that better match our collective intuitions of what is just. 10
Most, but not alL states appear to follow the reasons theory in
their criminal Ltvv. 11 although there is often some ambiguity as to
which theory of justification they actually adopt. des pite the apparent
clarity of first appearances. 12 T he Model Penal Code formulation is
quoted above: An actor is justified if she believes that her conduct is
necessary for defense. 13
Current English law also appears to adopt the reasons theory.
Professors Smith and Hogan, for example, conclude that the law " is

must act for that particular purpose); J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 37
(8th ed. 1996) (requiring state of mind as well as state of fact for justification to be
reasonable); Michael Corrado. Nores on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses. 82 J. CR!ivl.
L & CRIMINOLOCjY 465. 489 ( 1991) (arguing that state of mind is a necessary component
of justification and that Robinson's proposed externalist perspective is impossible to
accept); Kent Greenawalt. The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1984) (recognizing that most modern statutes require a
subjective belief in justification and that Robinson's fully objective approach is an
exception).
7. See Brian Hogan. The Dadson Principle, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 679, 680 ("It seems
to me absurd to say that I may jusrifv or excuse my conduct, however callous it was in the
circumstances known to me at the time. by showing that there existed other circumstances
which, had I but known ol them. would have justified or excused my conduct."),
8. See Arnold H. Loewy. Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the
Factors on Which Our Crirninal Law Is Predicated, 66 N,C. L. REV. 283. 289 (1988)
(arguing that, as a matter of fairness, the issue ought to be one solely of culpability rather
than result).
9. See Kevin McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process , 40
HASTINGS LJ. 957, 978 (1989) ("[A purely objective view of self-defense] is a more
difficult factual question for the defendant to resolve than the question of her own
subjective belief since calculation of the harm threatened involves a number of variables
[that] are beyond the defendant's ability to perceive .... ").
10. See Robinson, supra note 2.
ll, See 2 ROBINSON. supra note 3, § 184(b ). at 399-403 (listing state criminal code
justification sections that include a requirement that the actor "believe" his or her
conduct is justified).
12. See Robinson , supra note 2. at 51-54 (noting that the Model Penal Code
ultimately recognizes the importance of the distinction between a "belief" in a
justification and actuaL objective justification, when it creates the concepts of
"privileged" and unprivileged justification).
13. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 3.02(1), 3.03(3)(a), 3.04(1), 3.05(l)(b), 3.06(1).
3.07(1) (1985) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting the
Model Penal Code formulation).
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stat ed exclusive ly in terms of the ckfe nclant's be lief.'' 1'1 citing the
cases of G ladsrone Yilil!iams . Dodson . and Thain .15 Sec tion 24 of
England's Police and Criminal E vidence Act of 1984 appears to be an
exce ption to th e ge neral rule , for it justifi es an arrest even if th e
officer did not at the time know of or bel ieve in the justifying
c ircumstances, 16 reflecting a cleecls t heory of justification. Cla uses 44
cmd 185 of th e proposed C ri rninal Co de for Engbn d and Vvales
appare ntl y wou ld broaden th is exce ption to rnuke it th e general
rul e .17 Tha t is, they adopt a clc cds theory as the ir general approach .
T hey provide a justification clefcns<:: if the actor "uses such force as.
in the circumstances 1vhiclz e.risi,'. is immediate ly nccessmy and
reasonable for defense. 1" Inte res tin gly , the drafters claim that the
provision codifies th e common law of self-defense and d efe nse of
another. 19 They concede that it modi fies the common lavv of defense
of property but argue that this modificat ion is necessary to avoid an
irrational inconsistency between th e rules for the differe nt defensive
force defenses. 20
The contrasts between the two theories are illuminated when we
consider how the deeds theory and the reasons theory suggest
different results at each of the two conflict points: (1) when the actor
mistakenly believes her conduct is no t justified (the unknowingl y
justified actor); and (2) when the actor mistake nly believes her

14. SMITH & HOGA N, supra note 6. at 265.
15. Glads tone William s, 78 Crim. App. 276 (i 9i'\3) ; Regina v. Dadson. 4 Cox C. C. 358
(Crim. App. 1850) ; Regina v. Thain , l985 N. lr. 45 7 (C.A.).
16. Poli ce and Criminal Evidence Act. 1984. ch. 24. ~ 4(a) (E ng.) (providin g that a n
actor may arrest witho ut a warrant ··anyone who is in the act of co mmitting an a rrcstab!e
offe nce"): id. § 5(a) (providing th at an actor ma y arrest without a warrant '·anyone wh o is
guilty of the offence"): id. § 7( a) (p rovidin g th at an actor may a rrest without a warrant
'"anyo ne who is about to commit an arrestable offence").
17. See 1 A CRIMI NAL C ODE FOR ENGLAN D AND W A L ES cis. 44 , 185 (Law
Commission, Report a nd Draft Criminal Cod e Bi111 989).
LS. 1 id. (emphasis added) . These same proposed code provisions also allow a
defense if the actor uses such force as. ·' in th e circumstances ... which he believes to
exisr,'· is imm ediately necessa ry and reasonable for defense. 1 id. (emphasis added) Th e
use of this " believes" language does not make the provis ion one based upon a reaso ns
the ory of justification , for it still allows a justification with o ut req uiring proof of a belief in
th e justifyin g circ umstances. The effect of such language is to aii O\v a defense either upon
actu al or believed justifying circumstan ces. Nothing in the deed s theory prohibits a
defense for mistake as to a justifi c ~ltion. On th e contrary. it assumes th at such a defense
wi ll be provided but wi ll be unders tood to be an excuse . Not e that th e provision of th e
proposed cod e does not identify eith er defense as a justification or an excuse.
19. Th e drafters explain : " [I]f his defe nce is th at he was defe nding his perso n. or th at
of another. the test at common law is whether what he did was reasonable'' 2 id. 9l 12.25 ,
at 231 (emphasis add ed).
20. See 2 id.

.,
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conduct is justifi ed (mistak e as to a justification) .

The Un knmving!y Ju stified Acror
Ass ume a person's con duct is obj ective ly justi fi ed but he does
not realize this: he mistakenly believes it is unjustifie d. For exa mple,
th e pe rso n mugs a jogger, on ly to fi nd o ut that the victim was a clubwie lding attack er. \Vh et her the beating of th e attacker -thought-tobe -a-jogge r is justified depends o n whe the r it is the q ual ity of the
deed or the act or's reasons for it th at pro vide the rationale for
justification defenses.
U nder th e deeds theo ry, when the per so n· ~, conduct in fa ct
avoids a greater societal harm but th e perso n is unaware of thi s, the
co nduc t is justified despite th e acto r's ignoran ce. Howeve r, the
pe rso n 's be lief th at th e co nduct is not justified will give rise to
attem pt li ability (assum ing the jurisdiction punishes lega lly
impossible a ttempts, as most do 21). Thus. the use o f force against the
attacker-thought-to-be-a-jogger is justifie d and the acto r will h ave a
defense to the substantive offense for assa ult. but the actor will be
liable for an attempted assault. A tte mpt is an offense that exists to
punish just such manifested intention to co mmit an offense , wh e n the
harm or evil of the offe nse do es not in fa ct occur , and presents a
situation analogo us to that of the unknowingly justified actor , who
h as manifested an intention to act unjustifiably , but in fact no net
societal harm has occurred.
Und er the reaso ns theory, if the justifying ci rcumstances exist
but the ac tor is unaware of them and acts for a different purpose, a
justification defense is de nied . If what matters is the reason for the
deed , not the deed itself, the for ce used against the attacker-thoughtto-be -a-j ogger is not justifie d. While it might have been the right
deed, n ecessary for self-defense, it was for the wro ng reason.
B.

lvlistake as to a Justification

More common is the re ve rse case: A person 's conduct is
objective ly unju stified but the person subj ectively , mistakenly
be li eves th at it is justified. In such cases of mistake n justification , the
actor be lieves that he r conduct avoids a greater harm , when in fac t it
does not. T he club-wielding attacker , when successfully overcome
and dragged to the street light , turns out to be a jogger carrying a
flashlight whose bulb is o ut. W hethe r bea tin g the jogger-mistaken21 . See 1 ROBI NSON . supra note 3. ~ 8.5(c). a t 428 n.28 (l istin g a nd upda tin g
author iti es).
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for-an-attacker is justified depends again on wheth er th e justificatio n
defense is give n (1) because th e conduct in fact is justified. o r (2)
because th e perso n acts for a justified reason.
U nd er a reasons th eory , th e force used aga inst the joggc rmist aken-fo r-an- attacker is justifie d because it is use d for the purpose
of se lf-d efe nse. The ac tor 's reaso n is right eve n if th e conduct is
wrong. U nder the deeds theory, a pe rson who mistakenly believes
t hat the cond uct is justified is not just ified . although the person may
gZt in an exc use defense if the mistake is reason ab le or p erhaps a
mitigat ion e ven if it is not. 22
Not e that in this case the end res ult under the two th eor ies
seems to be the sa m e. The difference is primarily a lab eling matter:
T he pe rso n who re aso nabl y but mistakenly believes that he r co nduct
is justified is ''justified" und e r the reasons theory but only "excused ..
und e r th e de eds th eo ry.
This difference m ay h ave practical
implications for third parties. For exa mple, a jurisdiction might
criminalize resistance to justified force, like a lawful arres t , yet allow
resistance to excused force , like that of the psychotic aggressor. 23
T hi s common approach creates problems for use of the r e asons
theory. Presum ably we want the victim to be able lawfully to resist
the actor who is mistaken as to a justification. The jogge r mistaken
for a mugge r ought to be able lawfully to resist the misguided attack.
But, if the attacker mistakenly believes she is justified and, as the
reasons theory would have it, that makes her " justified," then the
criminal code must do some fancy dancing to reach the prop e r result.
It must create a special rule that allows defenders to d efe nd against
these special kinds of justified attacks but not oth er kinds of justified
attacks.
B ut, putting aside this third-party complication for the r easons
theory, the result of the two theories is the same for the ac tor at
hand. Both the deeds theory's excuse defense and the reasons
theory's justification defense exculpate the actor who mistakenly
believes she is justifie d. Yet, the different views of justification may
show themselves in another aspect of defense formulations that ha s
been the subject of much disagreemen t: the proper treatment of
mistake as to a justification . All agree that a rea sonable mi stake as
to a justification ought to exculpate fully. ·what is the proper
22. See, e.g. , MOD EL PENAL COD E § 3.09(2) (1985) (providing redu ce d li ab ility for
unrea sonab le mistakes as to a justifi ca tion) .
23. See, e.g., id. § 3.11( 1) (defining "unlawful force ," wh ich trigge rs a right of justified
defen sive force, as includin g the attack of th e psych otic aggre ssor but excluding privileged
(obj ectively justified) fo rce, such as th at used to make a lawful arrest) .
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trea tm e nt of an unre ason able mistake as to a justification?
A majority o f juri sdi ct ions permit a mistak e-as-t o-a-justification
defe ns e onl y if the actor 's mistak e is r e asonabl e . An unre asonable
mistak e, reckle ss or negligent , gives no defe nse and hence gene rates
full lia bi lity for the substantive offe nse Y A minority of jurisdictions
give a co mplet e defe nse fo r reasonab le mistake bu t also a llow a
mitiga ti on for an honest but unreason ab le mistake. 25 Th e level o f
li ability , tha t is . the ex ten t of the mitigation given , typicall y is ti e d to
the leve l of cu lpabi lity of th e mistake: A n egli ge nt mi stake. being
less culpabl e th a n a reckless mistake, gives a great er mi tiga tion th a n
does a r eck less mi stak e .2r,
Th e few juri sdict io ns that tak e th e dee ds app roac h m
formul a ting the ir justifi ca tion defe nses objec tive ly (for example,
No rth Dakota a nd the Proposed Federal C riminal Cod e) all give
mitigations for unreason able mistakes as to a justification Y In
contrast, a majority o f the jurisdictions that take a reasons approach
and formulate th eir justification defenses subjectively tak e the aU-o rnothing approach, giving no mitig ation or defense for unreasonable
mistakes as to a justification. 28 This pattern suggests a conn ection
between the de eds-reasons dispute and the dispute over the proper
treatmen t of unreasonable mistakes as to a justification. B ut the fact
is there is no logical reason why th e reasons theory should demand an
aU-or-nothing approach.
One could speculate about the source of the ap parent
correlation between the reasons theory and the aU-o r-nothing
approach. If one views mistaken justification as a justification , it
would be e asy to conclud e that an aU-or-nothing approach is n eed ed .
After all , a U-or-noth ing is the way obj ecti ve justifica tion does
operate. Either the actor's conduct avoids a greater harm and is to
be enco uraged or at least tolerated in the future , or it does not avoid
a greater h arm and is to be discouraged in the future. When the
subjective reasons theory of justification combines obj ecti ve
justification and mi staken subj ective justification under the same
24. See 2 ROB!i\ISO N, supra note 3, § 184(a), at 395 n.l (listing and updating
au thorities).
25. See 2 id.
26. See, e. g.. MOD EL PENA L CODE§ 3.09(2) .
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-01 to -09 (1985) ; NATIONA L COM tv!! SS ION ON
R EFORM OF FED ER AL CRI MINAL LAW , A PROPOSE D N EW FED ERAL CRIMIN AL CODE
ch.6 (1971 ). For a li st of juri sd icti o ns th at have at least one obj ecti ve justi fi ca tion statu te ,
see 2 R OB INSON , supra note 3, § 122 (e) , at 22 n.l9.
28. See 2 ROB INSON, supra note 3, § 184( a), at 395 n.l (listing a nd updat ing
authorities) .
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lab el, "justified ," it sh o uld be n o sur prise that such labe ling creates
the te nd ency to treat a mis ta ke n jus lificatio n as if it we re a tru e
objective justifica tion. It sho uld be no s urpri se to see mistak e as to a
j ustification tre ated, like a ll oth e r j us tificat io ns, as an all-or -n oth ing
IS:iu e .

T his sam e possib ilit y fo r co nfu sio r-: docs no t exist under th e
deeds approach to fo rm ulating justifica tions . T he deed s theory
di stingui shes tru e objectiv e ju st ifi ccn io ns fr om mistakes as to a
justification , anci it treats th e !<n te r as excuses.
Objective
j us tificatio ns are p;·operl y all -or-n o thin g matters. M istakes as to a
justificat[ o n, !ike o th e r ex c u s e~.. j u~;t <1 S ct•..::arly are not ali-or-no thi ng
rtl Ztt ters. E xcu ses fu nction as part of l;m·· s adjudicat ion of an actor 's
blameworthiness for a vio lation.
Blam e wo rthiness exis ts on a
contin uum , as is evident by th e doctrine s t hat contribute to this
fun ction.
A m ong the differe n t func:ti ons of th e criminal law , objective
justificatio ns serve the e x ante rui e articul ation function , telli ng
people the rules for future conduct. Co nversely , excuse s, including
mistaken justification , perform an ex post adjudication function ,
assessing the d egree of liability and puni shment for a violation of the
rules of conduct. 2Y
In p erforming the adjudication functi on , doctrines commonly
express degrees of liability and punishment. For example , criminal
codes typically recogn ize levels of culpa bility: purpose, knowledge,
reck lessn ess, and negligence . The law also recognizes mitigations for
pa rtial exc uses in both its definitio n of offenses (such as the extreme
mental or em otional disturbance mitigation in homicide 30 ) and its
sen tencing rules (such as the fe deral sentencing guideline
authorization fo r se ntence red uctio n b elow the guidelin es for
offenders influenced by coercion, duress, or diminish ed cap acity-' ' ).
Under the deeds theory , m istak es as to a justification are seen as
excuses, and like other doctrines for the adjudi cation of an actor 's
b lamewo rthiness, the resulting liab ility m ay reflect a continuum of
iiability.
Reasonable mistakes m ay excuse e ntire ly, while the
culpability inherent in unreason able mistakes may sugges t something
less- a mitigation ra the r than a defense.

29. See Pa ul H. Ro bin son. A Fu nction al A nulysis of Crim inal La w, 88 Nw. U. L. R EV .
057. 889-96 (1994); Pa ul H . Robin son. Rules of Co nduct and Prin ciples of Adjudication , 57
U . C HI. L. REV. 729,729-71 (1990) .
30. See, e.g., M ODE L P ENAL C ODE§ 2 10.3(1 )(b) .
3 1. See, e.g.. U.S. SE NTE NCING GUID E LI N ES M ANUA L §§ 5K2.12, 5K2.13 (1 997) .
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The Importance of Com munity Vie ws in the Formulation of'
Criminal L aw

B efore we launch into an exposi tiOn o f the process of
determin ing community moral intuitions in the re asons versu s deeds
controversy , we ought to say just '>v hy we think com munity views are
rel evant to the deba te. F irst th ose debnting the issue have con ceded
the rele vance of com mun ity views, wh e n th ey mak e state me nts
point in g out tha t the de e ds theory of just ificati on is ' ·ab surd . "~ 2 'vVhat
thi s con clu sion turns out to mean is that t he author of th at sta tement
fe els that the deeds the ory violates his m or al intuitions . ;1nd it implies
that his rno ral intuitions are th ose that a ll co mm unit y mernbers wo uld
also hold . T his is a n empi rical proposition; it may tu rn out that the
co mmunity h o ld s vinvs that resemble a deeds theory o f justification
rather than a re aso ns th eory or, as that writer asser ts, vice versa . In
any event, those writers appealing to moral intui tio ns to suppo rt their
theory have con ced ed , at a minimum , that the com munity intuitions
deserve a place in the debate Y Thus one task is to determine
community moral intuitions, the degree to which these intuitions
support any of the relevant justifica tory theories, and the consensus
with which community members hold their views.
A second reason for seeking to discover community views is that
it is at least necessary to know when legal codes, fo r whatever reason,
conflict with or override the moral intuitions of th e governed
community. For when they do , it is useful for the code drafters to
educate the community as to why the code form ulation is preferable ,
e ither m orally or otherwise. 'vVithout th is education , conflicts that
the community discovers between legal codes and moral intuitions
are likely to engender socially destructive sentime nts and actions on
the part of the governed. (Thi nk of the consequences of prohibition
in the U n ited States?1)
Of course, it is possible tha t citizens are unaware of the conflict
between codes and their moral intuiti o ns-whi ch brings us to the
third reason to discover community intuition s in various are as
governed by codes. Absent knowledge of the tr ue provisions of the
code, citizens are likely to believe tha t the cod e conforms with their
ovvn m ora l intuitions. 35 If the comm uni ty moral intuitions are in fact
32. See Hogan , supra note 7, at 680.
33. Se e supra note 3 an d accompa n ying text.
34. See generally Paul H. Robinson & J o hn M. Da rley. The Utility of Desert. 91 Nw.
U . L. REV. 453,487 (1997) .
35. In a re ce n t study. New J e rsey cit ize ns repor ted that attemp t was crimin a lized by
the state code in ways thnt were tig htly coupled with the ir own mo rn! intu itions, b u t very
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quite deviant from the actual co nt ent of th e code. th e code is failing
its ex ant e function , fa iling to provide known clear guideli nes that
peop le can use to govern their conduct.
Finally, we have argued elsewhere that th e criminal code ought
tu be in gene ral agree ment with the moral pr inciples of those the
code gove rns. 30 Here is a brief summary of th e argument: The rea l
power to enforce compliance with society's rules o f prescribed
conduct lies not in the threat or reality of officid criminal sa nction,
but in the povver of the intert'Yvin ed forces of social and ind ividua l
n1o:·<.!l con troL T he networks of in ter c ersonal relationshi os in which
peop ie find themselves, th e social norms and prohibi ti ons sh ared
amon g those re la tio ns hips and transm itte d through those socia l
net\vorks, and the internalized representations of thc·se no rrns and
moral precepts cause people to obey the law. 37
T he law is not irrelevant to these social and personal forces.
Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in creating and
maintaining the social cons ensus necessary for sustaining mora l
n orms. In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may
be th e only society-wid e mechanism that transcends cultural and
ethnic differences. T hus , th e criminal law's most important real
world effect is arguably its ability to assist in the building, sh aping,
and maintaining of these norms and moral principles. It contributes
to and harnesses the compliance-producing power of interpersonal
re lationships and personal morality.38
The crimina l law can have a second effect in gaining comp liance
wit h its commands. If it earns a rep utation as a reliable statement of
what the community, given sufficient information and time to refl ect,
perce ives as condemnable , people are more likely to defer to its
commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to fo llow in
those borderline cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is
unsettl ed or ambiguous in the min d of the actor. The importance of
this ro le sho uld not be und eres timated; in a society with the complex
interd ependencies characteristic of ours, an apparently harmless
action can have destructive consequences. 'When th e action is
crimin alized by the legal system , one wants the citizen to respect the
law in such an instance even though he or she does not immediately
L

•

poorly coup led to the ac tu al code provisions. See John Darley et a!., Conununity
Swndards fo r Defining Allempr: In consistencies with the Model Penal Code . 39 AM .
BEH AV . SC I. 405 , 414 (1996).
36. See Robinson & Darley, sup ra note 34.
37. See id. at 468-7 1.
38. Seeid. at 471 -74.
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intuit why that action is banned. Such deference IS facilitated if
citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide to
appropriate prudential and moral behavior.' 9
T he extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in both these
respects-in facilitating and communicating societal consens us on
what is and is not condemnable, and in gaining compliance in
bord erline cases th rough deference to its moral authorit y- is to a
Q.reat ex tent cleoendcnt on the cle£ree of moral credibilitv that th e
criminal law h<1S ach ieved in the minds of the ci tizen s it governs.
Thus. the criminal law's moral credibility is ess ent izll to effective
crime control and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability
is perceived as '"d oing justice," that is, if it ass igns liability and
punishment in ways that the community perceives as consistent with
the community's principles of appropriate liability and punishment.
Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and therefore its crimecontrol effectiveness, is undermined by a distribution of lia bility that
deviates from community perceptions of just desert.
The central point is this: The criminal law's power in nurturing
and communicating societal norms and its power to have people
defer to it in unanalyzed cases are directly proportional to criminal
law's moral credibility.
If criminalization or conviction (or
decriminalization or refusal to convict) is to have an effect in the
norm-nurturing process, it will be because the criminal law has a
reputation for criminalizing and punishing only that which deserves
moral condemnation, and for decriminalizing and not punishing that
which does not. If, instead, the criminal law's reputation is one
simply of a collection of rules, which do not necessarily reflect the
community's perceptions of moral blameworthiness , then there is
little reason to expect the criminal law to be relevant to the societal
debate over what is and is not condemnable and little reason to defer
to it as a moral authority.
We now need to turn to the task of discovering how the
community thinks about the cases that discriminate a reasons theory
of justification from a deeds theory, whether there are describable
principles that match the community's judgments, and whether there
is some degree of consensus among the judging community.
'-'

1

39. See id. at 474-76.

..__;
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II. TO O LS FO R T ESTIN G CRHviiNAL LAW THEORIES: SO CIAL
PSYCHO LO GY S CENA RIO RESEARCH

A.

Scenarios and Measures

T he method we chose to pr obe subjects' moral intuitions in this
stud y was the sce nario or vigne tt e method. Subjects are presented
with a short desc ripti on of a person 's conduct and are asked wheth e r
the act or should receive lia bility for the co nduct and , if so, ho w mu ch.
Subj ects next are gi ve n an oth er scen ario, and assess liability and
o un ishmen t for that actor. then anot her sce nario , and so on. Th e:
scen arios are va ried by th e re se<Jrch e rs in ways sugges ted by th e
th eories be ing tested , and the pa tte rnin g of liabilities assigned each
scenario provide diffe rential suppo rt for the comp e ting theories.
Rather than hrtving the subj ec ts work their way through wh a t
can quite quickly become a large number of differing scenarios, why
not just ask the subj ects whe ther they think a reason-centered or a
deed-centered theory of justifications is appropriate?
Because
psychologists have discovered that subjects often do not have mental
access to the principl es they use to make decisions and thus they
cannot accurately articulate those principles. 40 Instead they are often
driven to report principles that see m plausible to them at the time but
demonstrably do not match their actual decisions. 41
Therefore
researchers carry out what is called a policy-capturing study, in which
1

40. See P aul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression
Approaches to the Srudy of Info rmation Pro cessing in Judgm enr. 6 ORG ANIZ ATIONAL
BEH AV. & H u M. PERF. 649 (1 971).
In this a rticle . the authors describe an e a rl y
dem o nstration of thi s propos ition th at is relevant to the present study. They reviewed
studies in which the subj ect's tas k was first to make judgments a nd second to a rticulate
how tl1ey cam e to the judgme nts they m ade . See id. at 683-84. An example o f such a
judgme nt would be what we ights a stockbroker ass igned to various items of information
in forming his judg me nt a bo ut the desirability of a particular company's stock . In th e
studies they reviewe d "all found se rious discre panr:ies betwe en th e subj e ctive and
[objective] re lative we ights.'' !d. at 684. Th a t is, th e jud gment-m akers we re inaccurate in
reporting the we ights the y in fact placed on the va rious dim e nsions when they made th e ir
actual judgments . See id.
M o re ge ne ral ev idence for thi s prop osition is revi ewed in Rich ard E. Ni sbett &
Timo thy D eca mp Wilson. Telling /\!lore rhan We Can Kn o w: Verbal R eports on M ental
Pro cesses, 84 PSYCHOL. RE v. 231, 231 -59 (1977). Th e authors' study sho ws th a t
indi vid uals sometimes fail to ackn owledge the influence o f aspects of the stimulus th at
actua lly make a diffe re nce in their judgme nts, see id. at 243-45 , a nd oth e r times re port as
influential the effect of aspects th a t in fact do not e nter their judgment processes at all.
see id. a t 245-46.
41 . See N isbett & Wil son. supra note 40 , at 247-59 (s ugges ting th a t people rep o rt
what their own impl icit th eories of d ecision -makin g mark as impo rtant , rather th a n wh a t
is actu a lly important to th e m in prac tice ).
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subjects judge actual cases. The researchers then infer the subjects'
judging principles from the resulting patterning of responses to
different cases.~ 2
This is what we did in the present research. \Ve presented
subjects with short scenario descriptions of potentially criminal
actions. Because the focus of our research was on contrasting the
reasons theory with the deeds theory of justification defenses, we
designed the variations in our scenarios to reflect those different
theories. Generally. two cases differed in a way th at vvcm ld "make a
difference" to, for instance . a person who held a reasons-centered
view but not to a person with a deeds-centered view. "rviake a
difference" here means that the t\vo cases would generate different
liability judgments if the subject took one view of the theory of
justification, but not if she took the other view.
In other words, we conducted an experiment. Experimentation
is an unusual tactic in research concerning legal issues; other
empirical techniques su ch as opinion surveys, or the examination of
existing records, or other archival procedures are more common.
Part of what we seek to demonstrate to criminal law theorists and
code drafters is that experimentation, used to cap ture individuals'
patterns of liability assignment, can provide useful information on
their issues of debate.
Subjects first read a paragraph of core information that gave the
background to the various scenarios:
Jake is a farmer who has already harvested his corn crop.
His neighbor has not done so, so his three acres of corn are
still in the fields. The corn crop makes the difference, for
these farmers, between having a profitable season because
they have winter feed for their animals, or going into debt.
Running around several sides of Jake and his neighbor's
fields are dirt roads. Jake's farm and his neighbor's farm
are on a neck of land that stretches out into a lake. Out on
the end of the neck of land is the local town. Jake's
neighbor's fields cut the town off from the mainland, but
Jake's fields do not. The following map shows you this
layout.
42. See Robert S. Billings & Stephen A. Marcus. J'v!easures of Compensarory and
Noncompensatory Models of Decision Behavior:
Process Tracing Versus Policy
Coptllring, 31 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERF. 331, 331 (1983) (commenting
that " one of the oldest and most widely used techniques (for making inferences about the
decision process) is that of policy capturing. wherein the model guiding the decision
process is inferred from the relationship between the cues provided and the judgment of
the subject").
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At this point , the subj ects were given the map below in Figure l.
which makes cle ar the essentia l point: The neighbor's fie lds, but not
Jakc ·s fields, if burne d, woul d cre ate a successful fireb rea k for the
tO\VI1 .

FIGURE 1

Next the subjects read a specific scen ario and assigned a lia bility
to the perpetrator described in it. F or in stance, one offense scenario
read as follows :
Ja ke is angry with his ne ighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two sh are. vVhen he knows that
his neighbor is away, he se ts fire to the neighbor's three
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on ail sides by
dirt roads, and there is no wind , it is clear that the burning
will create n o danger beyond th at of des troying the corn.
T he fire destroys the entire crop.

1 l1 l l1
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This scenano is obviously a case of an offense of moderate
senousness. and \Ve u.s::: it to establish the sente nce that subjects
would ilive to this oarticular offense.
It provides a point of
comparison f or lat er cases. a "control'' or "contrast"" case, to see
whether subject s think the subsequent cases , in wh ich justifications
for the burning are ·ve n . deserve less lia bility a nd punishrnent than
the proLotype
the unjLtstified offense .
ScH-n e oc ook m
~ssiun
r·onsistent1v
hioher :;.1bilit;,,< th·,~~l~t.1
"-!:J
,_.,
·- -"-_;
others. T hese diffe rences are not the focus of ou1· concerns. I n the
1
IV ! ' <' 110"C in ' '1 0!.C 11 nu'oie'rt
''C"c~
1'') l
J ....., c ,· c. ,~,,,,nr'ta·~]
\.__! \.) _.. •-...
i..,.... to
t.
._)
ex perir11ental
srencrrin" ir jc· n ( •l re] PV '}'l t V/herher e ar h SUbJ'P('i· \":1': ,~~ .oe "l C~ ]'c'llhr
1.)
harsh o r easy :;cntencer. Om interest is in the pattern ing of the
difference in lia bility between specific scenarios. not the absolute
amount of liabili ty in any scenario.
As no te d a bove , scenarios differ in ways designed to e licit one
pattern of liability assignments if the subject uses a reasons theory of
justification. and another if the subject uses a deeds-theory. For
instance, another scenario read as follows:
J ake is angry wit h his neigh bor over a dispu te a bout use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that
his neighbor is away , he sets fire to the neighbor ' s three
acres of corn. B ecause the field is bounded on all sides by
dirt roads , it is clear that the burning will create no danger
beyond that of destroying the neighbor's corn. The fire
destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to Jnke, lightning has
started a fire upw ind from his and his neighbor's fie lds and
the local town a nd the fire is burning toward the town and
endangering the people who live there. H is burning the
field creates a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are
saved.
~·
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From a reasons perspective, the perpetrator is equally liable in
both cases-he intende d a har m ful act. The fact that the act had a
secon d, helpful, uninte nded , consequence is irrelevant. B ut it is not
irrelevant to a person holding a deeds-based theory. T herefore an
individual assigning a significantly lower lia bility to this second case
is revealing th at she hold s a deeds-based theory of justification, while
an individual who assigns this case the same liability as the previous
one is revealing a reaso n -based theory.
Notice that we have attempted, and we h o pe succeeded, in
making the two scenarios differ in only one way , the way that is
relevant to the theoretical comparison in question. T he subjects
should have perceived the different scenarios as having the same
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overall characte1·istics, s::1 that any di fferences in liabilities ;Jssignecl
can be attributed to the one char-acteristic that is varied between the
contrasting scenarios.
T he task of each subject, then. in response to each scenario was
to assig:n a degree of liabilitv to the orotagonist in the scenario~-in
their view, to assign punishment to a wrongdoer. Subjects did this by
marking their judgment on the scale shown below, a scale with which
they quickly became familiar:
'-....-'

'-

,.)

l

.._.

LlABlLlTY SCALE

ll

0
no liab. tiab.
but no

puni:-h.

1 c!Jy

2 wks

2 rno

6 mo

1 yr

_1

yr

7 yr

15 yr

30 yr

life

imprisonm~nt

As can be seen, the scale gave subjects a choice of assigning to
the protagonist no criminal liability, liability but no punishment, or
eleven leve ls of punishment, prison sentences ranging from one day
in jail to the death penalty. Notice that the difference between two
adjacent prison sentences becomes greater as one moves to the right
end of the scale . F or instance, an assignment of punishment level 2 is
an assignment of two weeks in prison, an increase of only thirteen
days over punishment level 1. An assignment of punishment level 9
is a fifteen-year increase from the punishment represented by level 8.
Vve constructed the scale in this way for two reasons. First, and
primarily, the differences correspond to the differences in grading
categories used in typical American criminal codes. 43
This
correspondence is quite important because it means that we can
translate a difference between two liability units into a difference of
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West Supp. 1998) (defining five grades of
felonies and two grades of misdemeanors, carrying statutory maximum punishment terms
of the death penalty and life imprisonment. 30, 15, 5, and 1 year, and 60 days
imprisonment): 730 ILL. CO!v!P. STAT. 5/5-8-1 , 5/5-8-3 (West 1993) (defining seven grades
of felonies and three grades of misdemeanors , carrying the maximum terms of death
penalty and life imprisonme;1t. 30, 20, 15, 7, 5, 3, and 1 year. 6 months, and 30 days
imprisonment): N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 60.06 , 70.00, 70.15 (McKinney 1998) (defining five
grades of felonies and two grades of misdemeanors, carrying the maximum terms of the
death penalty and life imprisonment, 25, 15, 7, 4, and 1 year , and 3 months imprisonment):
VA. CODE ANN.§§ 18.2-9, 18.2--10, 18.2-12 (Michie 1996) (defining six grades of felonies
and four grades of misdemeanors , carrying the maximum terms of the death penaltv and
life imprisonment, 20, 10, 5. and 1 year. and 6 months imprisonment).
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one offense gr ade in a criminal code .-+-; Second , this sch em e is useful
because the diffe rences correspond, roughly at le ast , to wh at ordinary
people perceive as eq ual differences be twe e n sentences . T hus th ese
sor ts of differences are the on es avail able to co de drafters wh en they
decid e hmv to grade a n offe nse, the o nes juries and judges must deal
with when sentencing a convicted offe nde r. a nd perhaps the ones that
come to the min ds o f citizens vvhen they read and think about
crirnin al se ntences.-' 5
In designing the scenarios, our tas k was to create as ma ny as
were nee ded to proY id c a reasona bly compl ete test of the
implications of the reaso n- and deed -b ased theories an d their
differences. VIe fo und th a t ele ven scenarios were needed. The fu ll
text of these sce narios is p resente d in the Ap pen dix to this Article .
'Wh at is revealed by co ntrasts be tween vario us scenarios we will
describe in detail in Part IV.
Pilot testing indicated th a t the el even scenarios could be re ad
and evalu ated by a subject in approxim ately half an hour. Further,
the subj ects were able to maintain concentration ; their reports
indicated that they found the task quite interesting and were
intrigued by thinking about what differences in the cases "made a
difference " to them. Each of our subj ects respond ed to all of the
cases. In the experimental design literature, a stud y having these
characteristics is referred to as a " within-subj ects design. " This
design focuses the subjects ' attention on the differences between the
scenarios. The danger is th at they think that the existence of a
difference implies an instru ction fro m th e researcher that the
diffe rence should " make a diffe rence, " tha t is, that it should provoke
different liability assignm e nts fro m th e subj ect. 46 T o counter this
possibility, we told subjects that we did not expect that different
scen arios necessarily should ge t different li ability judgme nts and th at
they we re to give us their own judgme nts abou t wha t differences
matte red. Lookin g over the individual response pro tocols from this
experiment and oth er similar ones we have conducted, we note that
44. T he utilit y of th is co rrespo nde nce will becom e cle ar in late r d iscussions of the
in te rpre tations of th e res ults. See infra text accom pan ying notes 57-70.
45. The scale used here is the sam e as the one de ve lo ped an d fi rs t used in PAU L H .
ROBI NS ON & J O HN M . D A RLE Y, J USTJ CE . LlA BJLITY , A ND BLAi'v! E : CO MM U NITY V IEWS
A ND TH E C RIM INA L L A W (1995) . in whi ch we report th e res ults of a n umbe r of studies
that ma p the commun ity"s pe rcept io ns of the app ro priate li a biliti es to assign in vario us
cri m inal si tua tio ns . For a more le ngthy d iscussion of the sca le and its propert ies, see id. a t
223-25 .
46. For a fuller discussio n of the stre ngths and wea knesses of withi n-subjects designs
in th is sor t of rese arch , see id. at 221 -22.
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subj ects did rate some cases alike as to the li a bilities they generated .
As is usual in these designs, the order in which the cases were
given to the subjects was randomized. T o mak e the subj ects '
contrast in g task simpler for them, cases with one dimension of
variati on were grouped together. Th e order of cases within these
groups. as wel l as the order in which th e groups were presented , was
ran domize d in order to prevent resul ts from bein g undetectab ly
depend en t upon the order in which the sc enarios were judged.

B.

The Sample of Subjects

Any research study must se lect subjects from the popul a tion
about which the resea rch generalizations arc intended to apply. O ur
concern is with the moral intuitions of the community of citizens
governed by the laws in question. Given that this resea rch is about
differences in the rationale for criminal sentencing that exist at the
national level, eventually one would wan t to construct a national
sample of subjects. For this initial study of th e issue, practical
considerations limited our selection of one se t of subjects to the lists
of jury-eligible citizens in a town in New Jersey. 47 The second set
consisted of college students who were readily available for research.
It is sometimes suggested that students are atypical , in that their
responses would differ from so-called ordinary people . Since we had
both students and ordinary people in our research, we were able to
test this contention.
We tested twenty-seven students (average age 19.2) and twentyone jury-eligible community members (average age 50.8); men and
women were equally represented in both sa mples , as were the major
religious affiliations of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. Two of each
sample were African-Americans, for a total of four in a panel of
forty-eight. Most subjects in both samples identified themselves as
politically moderate, with the students leaning a little more to the
libera l side of the continuum. Students filled out the questionnaires
in a room on campus; for the community members, questionnaires
were mailed out to them, and occasionally after a telephoned
reminder, the questionnaires were mailed back to us. As expected ,
conservatives assigned slightly higher liabilities to the various
scenarios we presented. Our jury-eligible community members also
assigned slightly higher liabilities, over and above the fact that

47. Of those contacted, 56% agreed to participate. This rather high rate of
particip ation was probably the result of the subjects' ag reement with our explan ation of
the goals of the research.
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conservatives did so. What is important, for our purposes, is that the
two groups of subjects did not show any significant difference in their
pattern of relative linbility assigned among the scenarios.

II I. LIABILITY PREDICTIONS
In justification defenses, we are in the minority of
commentators. 10
We believe the community's Vle\vs art.:: more
accurately reflected in doctrine based upon a deeds Lheorv of
justification. It matlers to lay persons whether a net societal harm
actually occurs or not. we think, just as it matters to t hem \vhether a
prohibited result, such as a resulting death. occurs or not. In
particular, we think the community sees the unknmvingly justified
actor as deserving the reduced liability of attempt rather than the full
liability that would come from denying a justification defense. 4 ~ As
to the reverse case of mistake as to a justifica tion, we think the
community views unreasonable mistakes as to a justification as
deserving mitigation, in contrast to the majority rule in the United
States. 50 We describe below exactly how these genera l claims
translate into specific predictions with regard to the liability results of
the scenarios used in the study.
The first six scenarios are contrast cases, the responses to which
established benchmarks for each test subject.
These scenarios
provide the full range of possible liability, as well as a variety of
intermediate points. Not only do they give us results of considerable
intrinsic interest in their own right, but more importantly for the
present purposes, they allow us to interpret the liability results of the
last five scenarios, the test scenarios. For each test scenario, we used
as a point of comparison the contrast scenario most relevant with
respect to the competing theories, from a case of an intentional
unjustified act to a co m pletely justified act, or any one of the many
possibilities between those two extremes on the continuum of
li ability. Taken together, the following six contrast cases represent
all of the obvious variations of a non-justification case to which the
subjects' responses might be compared.

48. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
49. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing attempt liability).
50. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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Th e Contrast Cases
Scenario 1. Inte ntional (Unjustified) Burning

Scenario 1 prese nts the prototype case of a burning tha t
int entional and for which no claim of justificati on exists:
J ak e is an gry with his nei ghbo r over a dispute ab out use of
water from a creek th at the two sh2re . V/hen he k nO\vs tha t
his ne ighb or is a\v ay, he sets fir e to th e neighbor's three
acres of corn. Because th e fie ld is boun ded on al l side s by
dirt roads. and the re is no win e!. it is cle ar that the burn ing
will create no danger beyo nd that of destroying the corn.
Th e fire destroys the entire crop.

JS

vVe expect the liabi lity h ere to be somewh ere mid-scale beca use
the offense is against only prop erty . Our past work suggests that it is
not likely to inspire th e heavy penalties at the high er end of th e
scale .51 Its purpose is to give us a liability rating against which we can
compare the liabilities assigned to other scenarios.

Scenario 2. Attempted (Unjustified) Burning
Scen ario 2 is similar to scen ario 1 except that the harm int e nded
does not actually come about:
Just as Jake sets the fire, the neighbor unexpectedly returns
and puts it out before it does any harm.
A crime lik e this one typically is treated as an attempt , as
compared to that in scen ario 1, which is referr e d to as the substa ntive
offense. From our past work , we expect the liability here to be
substantially Jess than that imposed in scenario 1, even though the
actor's conduct and inten tion are identical in the two cases. 52 The
fact is , th e vast majority of lay person s share a strong intuition that
whether or not the planned harm does or does not occur makes a
difference and that the occ urrence of harm increases the punishment
deserved . No claim of justification is at issue in scenario 2.
Scenario 3. Cre ated Risk of (Unjustified) Burning , Re alizedReckless Commission
Scenario 3 differs from scenario 2 in that the actor only risks th e
burning, rather than intending it. But as in scenario 1, he re the harm
actually comes about:

51. See, e.g .. R OB INSON & D A RLEY, supra note 45 , at stu d ies 6, 8, 11. 18.
52. See id . at studies 1. 17.

l
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Like all of the local farme rs. Jake ro utin ely piles dry
cornhusks near wh e re they are cut and eve ntually burns
them. Jake ha s on e such pile near his neighbor's fields.
Jake wants to get the pil e burned quickly ; the previ ous year
he waited and the pil e got soake d by rain. He is aware that
high winds are fo recast for today; '>Vinds that crea te a real
risk that his fir e will jump the gap bet\vee n his tr as h pile and
his neighbor 's com fi-:-~ ld s . D espit e this da nge r, Jake burn s
his trash pile , ho pi ng the fire will not jump to hi s neighbor 's
crop. The wind s con1c and the fire jumps to his neighbor 's
crop. T he fire cksi:ro ys the en tire crop .
We expect the liability here, as in scenari o 2. to be less than th at
m scenario 1. Such an uffense typically is terme d a "crime of
recklessness."
Scenario 4. Created R isk o f (U njustifi ed) Burn ing, U nrealizedE nda ngerment
Scenario 4 is simi lar to scenario 3, but here, luckily , the harm
does not come about:
Despite [the danger from the high winds], Jake burns his
trash pile, hoping the fi re will not jump to his neighbor's
crop. The winds come but, Jake is lucky, the fire does not
jump to his nei ghbor 's crop.
We think th e !lability will be less here than in scenario 3.
Liability also will be less than in scenario 2, we think, because here
the actor does not inte nd the harm but only risks it. This is an
application of the principle noted in our ea rli er work that greater
punishment is due for greater culpable state of mind: 53 Intending to
burn is more culpable than intend ing to create a risk of burning, all
other things being equal. Offenses like this commonly are termed
"end angerment" offenses. No claim of justification is at issue in the
scenano.
These four cases present variations of the culpability and harm
variables, as evidenced in T able 1.

53. See id. at st udi es 8. 9. 16.
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T ABLE 1. INTE RRELATI ON O F C O NTR AST CASE S J T HRO UG H 4

No Harm

Harm

I n tentional

Reck less

Sce n ario 1
Substantive Offense

Sce n ario 3
Reckless Offense

I
II

·~

l

Scena ri o 2
A tt empt

Scen ari o 4
E nd an germ e nt

Scenario 5. A ttempte d Risk Cre ation-A ttempted Endan germ e nt
In sce nari o 5 the actor thinks he is creating a criminal risk, but in
fact no such risk is created. In other words , it is a case of attempted
endange rment rather than the actual end angerment of sce nario 4:
Despite [the danger of high winds], Ja ke burns his tras h pile,
hoping th e fire will not jump to his neighbor 's crop. It turns
out th at the weather forecast was in error about the wind.
Jake 's burning never creates an y d anger to his n e ighbor 's
field.
We think it will have even less li ability than scenario 4. In
scenario 4, a risk of the h arm was in fa ct crea ted , while here no such
risk is created; the actor only mistake nl y believes that it is crea te d.
Scenario 5 (risk intended but no risk occurs) bears the sa m e rel ation
to scenari o 4 (risk intend e d and risk occurs) that scenario 2 (burning
inte nde d but does not occur) b ears to sce nario 1 (burning intended
and occurs). No claim of justifica tion is at issue in the scenario.
Scenario 6. Inte ntio nal J ustifie d B urning
In scenario 6, the fin al contrast case, the burning occu rs but is
clearly justifi ed, under b oth a reasons and a deeds theory. Not only
d o the obj ective circumstances ac tually exist th at make the burning
the right thing to do , but th e actor knows of the justifying
circum stan ces and acts because of them:
Jake hears over his Citizen' s Band rad io that lightning ha s
started a fire upwind from his and his ne ighbor 's fields an d
th e local town and that the fire is burning toward the town
and endangering the people who live there. He can see the
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smoke from the approaching fire and calculates th a t if he
burn s his neighbor' s corn crop he can create a firebr ea k that
will stop the fire. (Remember that Jake's own fi eld is not
locate d wh e re it could serve as a fireb reak.) Jake knows
that his neighbo r is not available to ask fo r perm ission. and
he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop.
Because of his quick wo r k the town and its inhabitants are
saved.
\Ve think Jake will get a complete defense in.this sccn<Eio.

B.

The Tesr Cases

\Vc now turn to the scenarios that discrimin a te bet"vveen the two
competing theories. As described above, a subject's response to each
of these cases is compared to her response to o ne or more of the
contrast cases relevant from the point of view of the compet ing
theories. It is from this comparison that we infer the subject's views.
Scenario 7. U nknowingly Justified Burning
Scenario 7 is the case of the unknowingly justified actor:
Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that
his neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on all sides by
dirt roads, it is clear that the burning will crea te no danger
beyond that of destroying the neighbor's corn. The fire
destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to Jake, ligh tning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and
the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and
endangering the people who live there. H is burning the
field creates a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are
saved.
Recall that the deeds theo ry, which we think better represents
community views , predicts this liability to be similar to that of
scenario 2, the attempt case. The actor's liability is based entire ly
upon his intention to burn without justifica tion , the classic rationale
for punishing an attempt. The reasons theory predicts that the ac tor
will have no defense and therefore vvill be liable for the full offense,
the same li ability as in scenario 1.
Scenario 8. Knowingly Justified Burning but with Bad Motive
Scenario 8 is a case in which the justifying circum stances exist
and the actor knows about them , but he acts for a bad motive , rather
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t han for a justificatory purpose:
Jak e hears over his Citizen's Band radio that ligh tnin g h as
st art ed a fire uowind
from h is and his n eighbor's
fie ld s and
'
~
the loca l town and that the fire is burn ing tmva rd the to wn
and endangering the pe o ple who live there . He can see the
smoke fron1 the approaching fire and calculates that if he
bur ns hi s nei ghbor's corn crop he can cre ate a firebre a k th;:lt
that Jak e 's ow n fi e ld is not
will stem. the fire. (Remember
'
loca te d \vhere it co ul d serve as a firebrea k.) Jake has n o
interc:st in saving the town: the townspeople h ave always
been unfr ie nd lv to him. F urth e r. Ja l<. e is angrv with hi s
neighbor ove r a d isput e abo ut use of water from a creek
that tht:: two share . H e d ecides to use the fir e as an e xcuse
to burn his neigh bor's corn crop . 'vVithout ask in g his
neighbor for permission, he burns th e fi e ld s. The fir e
destroys the e ntire cro p. B ec ause of his quick work the
town and its inhabitants are saved.
-

~

J

T his scenario is an interesting case because, reca ll from Part LB .,
most jurisdic tions implement the reasons the ory by d efe nse
formulations that require only that the actor "belie ve" that the
justifying circumstances exist. 54 They do not require that the actor
act for the just ifying "purpose, " even though "purpose " is a standard
culpability level commonly required by other criminal law doctrines.
Contrary to the legal rules, which give the same complete
defense fo r bot h a just ifica tory purpose and mere knowledge of th e
justifying circumstances, we think the community will find a
difference be twee n the two cases. 'vVe predict th at the person who
acts for the justificatory p urpose, as in scenario 6, will receive a
complete defense (no liability), whereas the person who acts knowing
only of the justifying circumstances but with a purpose other than to
avoid the greater harm, as in scen ario 8, will h ave som e leve l of
liability impose d.
A strict re ason s th eory might give no defense here . ·while the
actor knew of the justifying circum.stances, they were not his reason
for acting. B ut the reasons theory as adopted in current law treats
this actor as fu lly justifie d , thus imposing no liability.
T he deeds theory would give this actor a significa n t discount
from full liability , at least as grea t as that given the unknowi ngly
justified actor, because wh ile his m o tive may be bad , his conduct is
objectively justified. On the other hand, the actor in scen ari o 8 at
least does not think that he is causing a net harm , and therefore we
54. Se e supra te xt accompa nying not e 22.
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think will ha ve less lia bility than the un kno wingly justified actor of
scenario 7, \v ho does think so.55
T hese fir st t vvo t ·~s t scen arios p resent variations on the
unknowingly justified acto r. T he n ext three scenarios co nsider the
reve rse case of the actor \vbo mistaken ly be lieves he is justified. T he
pe rson se tting t he fir e thin k s that he h as a justification for doing so,
but h is re asons for t hi nking this become increasingty poorly
gl·o tlnded.
S cena ri o~ .

Mista i,: c

<:.1S

to Justificatio n , Reasonab le

Scena r io 9 prc ~; en t; \ he case of a re aso n abie mi sta ke <lS to a
justificat ion :
Jake hears over hi s Citizen ·s B and radio that li ghtn ing has
started a fire upwind from his and his n eigh bor 's fie lds and
the loca l town an d th at the fi re is burning toward the town
and enda ngerin g the people who li ve there. In t he past,
Citizen 's Band radio rep orts have often been true, but also
often false . Jak e stops two cars that are racing into to wn,
and bo th confirm tha t " the re is a big, o ut of control fire,
h eading this way ." (Any re asonable person wo uld thin k
there was a de structive fi re coming.) J ake can see the
sm o ke from the approaching fir e and calculates that if he
burns his n eighbor's corn cro p he can create a fir ebreak th at
will stop th e fire . (Reme mber that Jake 's own field is n o t
located where it could se rve as a firebreak .) Jak e knows
that his n eighbor is no t available to ask for permission, and
h e burns the fields . T he fire d estroys the entire crop. It
turns o ut that the radio repo rt was in erro r. The smoke was
from a con trolled burn being done by a crew of local
for esters and presen ted no d anger to the town or any of the
surrounding area.
B oth deeds and reasons theo ries wo uld give a complete defe nse .
O nly the labeling would be d ifferent. The deeds theory would
consider the acto r excu sed : the r e asons theory would consider the
actor justified. 56 A ll jurisdictions agree that a full defe nse is
appropriate in this case ; no issue of mitigation arises. Both the deeds
t heory, which we support, and th e reasons theory predi ct no liability.

55. Reca ll th at the deeds theory reli es upon atte mpt liabi lity as the so urce of li ability
for the unknowingly justified actor. Wh en an actor does not thin k that he is acting
unjustifiab ly (he knows o f th e justify in g circ um stances). it is unclear tha t attemp t liability
is a pprop riate .
56. See supra text accompa nying notes 22-23 .
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Scena rio 10. M istak e as to Just ification, l'Jegligent
Sce nario 10 is a case of a neglige nt mistake as to a justifica tio n,
differing from scenario 9 as follows:
In t he past, Citizen's B and radio repo ; ts bavc ofte n b ee n
true, but also often fa lse. Ja ke doc ~;n·t think of th is , a nd
a lth ough a reasonable pe rson wc u ld d o so. Ja ~\:e d oesn ' t
thi nk to ch eck on th e tr uth of the re;:;ort. but t he re is n o
do ubt in hi s mind that it is a da ng ,~r ou:;
} s ke can se e
th e smoke from the appro aching fire and ca.lcu la tes that if
. hb or ' s co rn cr op 'ne c.~n c;·e::'ttc a .Lire
r:· t;r eaK
'
h.e 'nurns h.. JS ne1g1
tha t vvill stop the fire.
T hose jurisdictions th at re q u.ire a n:: :1.sona ble m istake for a
d efen se , a majority of reasons theo ry jurisdictions, wo uld deny any
defense here and would impose full liability, as in scenario l. T he
jurisdictions that do recognize a mitigation for an unreasonable
mistake as to a justificatio n, which includes the few deeds
jurisdictions, will impose m ore liability than the complete defense in
scenario 6, but n o tably less than the full liability of scenario 1 that the
majority view predicts.
Scenario 11. M istake as to Justification, Reckless
Scenario 11 is a case of a reck less mistake as to a justification ,
when there is greater culpable state of mind than in scenario 10, but
the actor still h ones tly and sincerely believes that he is acting
justifiab ly. It differs from scenarios 9 and 10 as foll ows :
In the past, Citizen 's Band radio reports have often be e n
true , but also often false. J ake reme mbers this fact, and
realizes there might not be a dange rous fire, but doesn't
check on the truth of the report. He ca n see the smoke from
the approaching fire and calculates that if h e b urn s his
neighbor's corn crop he can crea te a fire break that wi ll stop
the fire.
T he majority all-or-nothing approach again would give no
defense and would impose full liability, as in scenario l. T he
mitigation approach again would give a mitigati o n fr o m full li ability,
although not as much as the mitigation given in scen ario 10. Thus, we
predict that the liability h ere will be greater than that in scenario 10,
but markedly less than that in scenario 1.
O ur predictions and those consistent with current law are
summarized in Table 2. G enerally , we think t he subjects w ill agree
with the predictions of the deeds theory and with mitigations for
unreasonable mistakes as to a justificati on.
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TA BLE 2.

SU!viMARY OF LIA BI LITY P REDICTIONS
CONTRi\ST CASES

I
r

·--::·,~,~~'

------S-ce_
· r-1a_r_·io_ _ _ _ _ _

I B asclirv~

Tntentional commission
of substantive offense

---r=l

2. Attempt

13.

Reckless commission

<1

]

~
'j

----1

~

i
t

'

14.

Endangerment

< 2 and 3

~

5. Attempted endangerment

<4

6. Justified commission

No liability

T EST CASES

Scenario

7. Unknowingly
justified burning
8. Justifying knowledge

Our Predictions
(Deeds Theory)

Predictions Consistent
wi th Current Law
(Reasons Theory)

=2

=1

(attempted burning) (no defense; full liability)
> 6, but< 7

without justificatory
purpose
9.

Reasonable mistake
as to justification
(MJ)

10. Negligent MJ

=6
(complete justification)

=6

=6

(complete excuse)

(complete justification)
I

> 6, but< 1

=1
(no defense; full liability)

11. Reckless MJ

> 6 and 10, but< 1

=1
(no defense; full liability)
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IV. LIAB ILITY RESU LTS

The mean

[~ability

for each of the scenarios is set out in Table 3.
TAB L E3 .
LlAB!LITY 1VfEANS

~~=-~~~="=::;~~~·-io=~~~.~~~-~~-

I

Mean

1

~

I

Impriso nm e nt

·

EqUiva 1e nt

1
"

II

Cont rast Cases

__,

l

1. Intention a l (u njustifi ed) burning

4.65

- 10 month s

2. Attempted (unj ustified) burning

3.52

- 4 months

3. Created risk o f (unjustified)
burn ing, realized
4. Created risk of (unjustified)
burning, unrealized

2.69

- 6 weeks

0.48

essentially
no punishment

5. Attempted ri sk creatio n

0.42

essentially
no punishment

6. In te ntional justified burning

0.57

esse ntially
no pun ishment

I
I

I

Tes t Cases
7. Unknowingly justified burning

3.63

- 4 month s

8. Know ingly justified burning
but with bad moti ve
M istake as to justification, reasonabl e

2.10

-2 weeks

19.

1.10

- 2 days

I 10. Mistake as to justification, negligent

2.02

- 2 weeks

11. Mistake as to justification , reckless

2.33

-4 weeks

A.

l

The Contrasi Cases

We begin wi th an examination of the results for the cases that
were designed to provide co mparative information for the test cases.
The scenario 1 contrast case of intentional burning with no claim of
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j uslification has a lia bility mean of 4.65 (equivalent to abo ut ten
m onths imprisonment).57 T his result is what on e might expect given
the nature of the offense , a property offense in which no risk to
persons is crea ted.
The scenario 2 contrast , the a tte mpt case, has a liab ility of 3.52
(just over four months). T hi s result is co nsistent vvith our expectation
of substantiall y reduced punish men t base d sole ly on the fortu itous
absence of the inte nded harm. Indeed. the ratio of penalties between
scenarios 1 and 2 is consisten t with thos e jurisdictions th at set the
grade of an attempt as one grade less than or half the pen alty of the
substan tive offense. 58 Recall that on our exponential pena lty scale,
one unit is equ ivalent to one offense grade in a typical modern
American criminal code and tha t each higher grade typically doubles
the penalty of the previous grade :'i 9
Scenario 3, in which the actor crea tes a risk of burning that is
realized, has a liability of 2.69 (6.2 weeks). A s predicted, it is less
than the liability in sce nario 1; here the actor does not intend the
h arm , but only risks it. T he importance of this difference in
culp ability level often is reflect ed by corresponding differe nces in
penalties. For example, in homicid e cases, this same culpability
difference results in an intentional killing being punished as murder
with long-term or life imprisonment or dea th , while a reckless killing
is punished as mansl aughter with a maximum penalty more in the
range of ten years. 60
Scenario 4, a case of risk creation in which the harm risked goes
unrea lized , receives a liability of 0.48, which is essentially no
punishment (a liability mean of 1.0 is equivale nt to one da y
imprisonment). No liability was assigned by 36.5% of subjects.
A no ther 42.3 % gave liability but no punishment. The remaining
21.2 % gave punishment ranging fr om one day to six months. T he
deeds theory predicted low li ability, from the concurrence of both the
discount for no resulting harm seen in scenario 2, and the disco unt for
lower culpability level seen in scenario 3. We have discussed
elsewhere this additive nat ure of different discounts from the full

57. More precise translation fro m liability means to imprisonment terms ca n be
obta in ed by using the tab le in ROB INSON & D ARLEY , sup ra note 45, app. Cat 283.
58. See PAUL H. ROBINSON , FUN DAME NTALS OF CRIM INAL LAW 297 (2d ed . 1995)
(citing statutes).
59. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (2) (1985) (makin g manslaughter a second
degree fe lony); id. § 6.06(2) (settin g the maximum term of impriso nment for se cond
degree fe lonies at 10 years) .
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intentional substantive offense .61 The liabi lity result here seems a
neat accumulation of the 1.1 discount from the fu ll offense seen in
scena rio 2 and the 2. 0 discount seen i,n scenario 3. T hus, a perfectly
ad ditive discount wou ld be 3.1. T he liab ility result here shows a 3.2
discount. It seems unlikely , howe ver. that this additive discounting
always will be quite so neat . Th is su bsta ntial reduction is consistent
wit h current law's treatment of such matte rs. In homicide, for
ex ample , creating a ri sk of death th<rt is unrealized is punished 8S
endangerment, which typically carries a ma ximum sentence of only
one year,('2 compared to life imp risonment or death for murder.
Scen ario 5 presents the case of attempted end8ngerment. As
expected, the liability mean is low, 042. T he result is only slightly
less than the result in scenario 4 (endangerment), and that small
difference is not statistically significant. 'We predicted a difference
be tween the two, with scenario 5 less than scenar io 4, to reflect the
absence in scenario 5 of the risk that in fact is created in scenario 4.
Our assumption is that the difference does not appear because the
scenario 4 liability is already so low no fur ther reduction is possible.
In scenario 4, 78.8% of the subjects imposed no punishment. That
leaves little room to distinguish scenario 5 as a case of even less
blameworthiness. (In scenario 5, 86.5% imposed no punishment.) If
scenarios with a more serious base offense were used, such as
homicide , the distinction we expected here might appear.
Scenario 6, the final contrast case, is an intentional justified
burning. As expected, it received essentially no punishment. Its
li ability mean was 0.57. No liability was assigned by 38.5% of the
subjects. Another 40.4 % gave liability but no punishment. The
remaining 21.2% gave punishment ranging from one day to one year.
T his baseline is not as low as we might have guessed but still reflects
the predicted judgment that the vast majority of subjects see this as a
case of little or no blameworthiness, despite the fact that an
intentional harm is caused.
To summarize the contrast case results , the results came out as
we predicted. Those predictions, it will be remembered, were based
on two principles: a liab ility discount given when the harm risked did
not actually occur, and a liability discount given as the harm risked
61. See Paul H. Robin son & John M. Darley , Objecrivist vs. Subjectivist Views of
Crim inality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory, 18 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1998).
62. See, e.g. , MODEL PEN AL CODE § 211.2 (making reckless endangerment a
mi sde meanor) ; id. § 6.08 (setting the maxi m um term of imprisonme nt for misdemea no rs
a t o ne year).
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T.he C"'ases .for ·vlhiclziFze Tiz ec)ries rJJc.! '"tsrijicali(Ji1 llave Dijjererzt
Predictions

The first two test ca'ses exarnine the community's vie·ws on cases
critical to the d~:e cl s- r eason debate . In sce nario 7, presenting the
unkno\vingly justified ::Jctor, the tvvo theo ries pre dict stark ly d iffe rent
re sults , and the dee ds theory predictions are confirmed.
The
perpetrator in scena rio 7 received a liabili ty mean of 3.63 (just over
four months). This re'suh is not statisticallY differen t from the
at tempt contrast case in scenario 2, as the deeds theory predicts.
Such liability is dramatically less than the 4. 65 li a bility (about ten
months) for the su bstantive offense that the reasons theory predicts.
T he deeds theory is clearly more consistent with community views on
this rna tter.
Scenario 8 presents the case of the actor who knows of the
justifying circumstances but who acts for ot her, non-justificatory
motives. Recall that curre nt law would give a complete defense in
such a case, although logic would seem to suggest that a strict reasons
theory would give no defense. 63 T he liability mean is 2.10 (2.6
wee ks), not the complete defense tha t current law would provideonly 7.8% of our subjects assigned a verdict of no liability-and not
the full liability that the reasons theory logically would seem to
suggest. It is consistent, however, with the deeds theory prediction of
liability being somewhat less than that of the unknowingly justified
actor. The actor is entitled to at least the discount given the
unknowingly justified actor because his act is objectively justified; a
greater harm is in fact avoided. Un li ke the unknowingly justified
actor, however, this actor's liability for attempt is less clear. His
knowledge of the justifying circumstances may suggest to him that his
conduct is not in fact crimina l, thus he does not have the clear
intention to violate t he law that the unknowingly justified actor has.
He might be viewed less as breaking the law than as taking advantage
of it. In any case, the results again are consistent with the deeds view
and inconsistent with the reasons view.
Turn next to the three scenarios in which the perpetrator,
mistakenly believing that the town was in danger of a fire, set his
neighbor's fields on fire to provide a firebre a k. The reasonableness
of the mistake varied across these three scenarios. Scenario 9
presents the case of a reasonable mistake as to a justification. Both
63. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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--subjects assigned liability of 1.10 (2.3 days), which >vas higher than \;:<::
ex pected. Further, only 17.3% gave the complete defense verdict of
"not guilty." On the other hand, 42.3 % assigned liability but no
p uni shment. Perhaps these subjects \vere concern ed ab out the
implicat ions of gi ving a complete defense in a case in ·vvllich the
cond uc t in fact is not ·'iustified in an obJ·ective sense. There is reason
to thin k that they should be concern ed, as discussed in Sectio n V.C:.
be lo\v. wh ich presents our proposal to re vise acquittal verdicts.
Scen? rios 10 and 11 are cases of unreasonabl e rnistakes as to a
justificat ion. l n scenario 10, the actor hones tly be li eves bis con du ct is
justified bu t is mistaken, and his mistak e is negligent r ath.: r than
reasonable. That is, a re asonable person in the actor's situation
would have been aware of a risk that the conte mplate d conduct was
not justifi ed. In scenario 11, the actor similariy honestly believes his
conduct is justified and is similarly wrong. B ut here his mistake is
more culp a ble; he is reck less. That is, he is aware of a risk that his
conduct might not be justified, although, on balance. he concludes
that it is justified. He disregards the risk (that the conduct might not
be justified) and proceeds with the conduct. In other words, he
makes a reckless mistake as to a justification.
A s expected , the subjects imposed greater liability in these two
cases than in the case of the reasonable mistake. Further, liability
was greater in the case of greater culpability in making the mistake:
2.02 (two weeks) for the negligent mistake, 2.33 (about four weeks)
:for the reckless mistak e. But this range of lia bility is considerably
less than that imposed by current law's majority rule, which denies
any defense or mitigation and imposes full subs tantive liability . In
the context of this burning offense, current law's assignm ent of no
defense would give the p erpetrator ten months imprisonment, as
im posed in scenario 1, not the two weeks and four weeks that
scenarios 10 andll, respectively, actually received. INe co nclude that
the subjects would very much support :ecognition of mitigations for
unre asonable mistakes as to a justification.64 These results suggest
t"t' :l.· ':
lc,·.
"--' C,''
-

..._ ._
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64. Reca ll the· correlation in law between the reasons theo ry liability for the
unknowingly justified actor and the all-or-nothing approach to mistake as to a justification
(denying a mitiga tion for an unreasonable mistake as to a justification). See supra text
accompanying notes 24-28. We reasoned that nothing in the reason s theory logically
requires adh e rence to the ali-or-nothing view. Our study results seem to confirm this
speculation. The persons in our sample cbsest to the reason s theory-th ose that gave the
smallest di sco unts to the unknowingly justifi ed actor in scenario 7. as against th e full
li ability of scen ario 1-were neither significantly higher nor lower in their liability
assignments in unreasonable mistake scenarios.10 anc\11. than th e other subj ects.
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that th e Mod e l Pen a l Co de 's mitigations of th is sor t should no t have
b ee n reje cre d so re gu la rly by st ate crimin a l cod e d raft e rs.65

V.

Ilvi PLI C:/\T lONS FO R CRIMINAL L AW REFORM

\Vith t he resul ts current m the reade r's m ind . \Ve turn
immedia tely to t he q ue.:.:t io n of how cr imi n al codes m igh t be m odifie d
in light of th e comm unity intuiti o ns rep o r ted here . The re su lts
renorted
in the prev
ic) US sect io n co nfirm th at m uch is r ight
[
.
- in cur rent
cr im in a l law fonnu lat. ion. But th e r esults also fr e quen tly ch a lle nge
crim in a l code forn1ui at ions and suggest a va ri ety of criminal law
refo rms . T hes e a lterati o n s \vo uld involve a reformu lat io n of o ffe nse
d efin it ions. altered fo rmu la tio ns of what co unt as d efe nses. a ncl a n
alt ered system of tr ia l ve rdicts .

A.

Th e Formulation and G ra ding of Offenses
\V hile th e study w as d esign e d to exa mine d efe n ses re late d to

65 . Fo r scenarios 9. 10. a nd l l. we added one m ore depe nde nt meas ure that prov ides
som e ill umination of o ur responde nts ' reactions to these sce narios . a nd perhaps of the ir
react io ns to other sce nari os as we ll. In all of the scen a rios in which the neighbor 's fie lds
act ua ll y burned , th ere is one ind ivid ua l who is obviously the in noce nt victim of even ts,
and tha t of course is the ne igh bor who lost his crop . W e asked respo nde nts " what sho ul d
be cl one" about th e ne ighbo r's loss . A number o f resp o nde nts wro te tha t th e ne igh bo r
sho u ld be compe nsated for his loss. (R ecall th at the instructio ns made cl ear that the loss
was a s ignifi ci:nt o ne , mov ing the fa rm fro m a pro fit to a loss.) A s the culp ab il ity for the
loss in these cases a lte red . so too did the id entit y o f th e ind ivid uals who owe d the
ne ighbo r compe nsatio n. Wh e n the perpe tr a tor made a reaso nab le m istake . respo nde nt s
thought that the town sho uld share in the task of provid ing compensat ion. altho ugh the
perpe trato r, who had mad e the mistake , also owed com pensat ion . Wh en the mistak e \vas
de scribed as negligent, and the n reck less, more of th e respo nde nts tho ught the burden of
provid in g compensati on fe ll so le ly on the perpetrator, and no t o n the townspeopl e .
A s we note d befo re. we had expecte d some ju dg me n ts of no li ability and inste ad
fo und j udgm e nts of liab il ity o f a ve ry mino r sor t.
A n im p ulse toward findi ng
compensation fo r th e victim m ay ex pla in th is d iffer e nce . T esting this possibility, we
adde d a questio n abo ut com pe nsa tio n to sce nario 6, in which sett ing fire to the ne igh bo r's
fiel ds was co mpiete ly j usti fied beca use it pre vente d the o ncoming fire fro m dest ro ying the
town. and we gave th is scena rio to six new respo nde nts, who first respo nde d to th e
compe nsa tion q uestion a nd then to the liability q uestion. The responses of these new
subj e cts we re q uite revea ling. As to compensati o n, all t hought compensa ti on was d ue and
tha t the tow nsfo lk sh ould be the major source of it. Severa l suggeste d, as a mo re than
tok en gesture of commu nity , that the fa rme r who se t th e fire shou ld give some of hi s crop
to the ne ighbor. V/h et he r th ey fe lt that this was "owe d" or sim ply a wi se and neighbo rl y
ges ture o n th e farm e r' s part was no t cl ea r. After deali ng with the compe nsa ti o n iss ue,
res po nde nts fe lt th at the qu es tion of li ab ility was m oot. P ressed to answe r, res ponde nts
ge ne ra ll y decided tha t " no t gui lty" was the appro pria te ve rd ict. O ne suggeste d " no
li abili ty."' What t hose ve rd icts sugges t is tha t, having re q uire d the de fe nd an t to pay some
compe nsa tion . the res po nde nts tho ught th a t add ing crimina l liabili ty wou ld gene ra te
excess ive to tal pun ishme nt .
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justificat io n, the results, speci fically those in the contrast cases, re vea l
something abo ut how the law ought to define offenses . In m any
resp ects, the resu lts support the general approa ch of curre nt law.
A co mparison of scenari os 1 and 2 ill ust rates tha t , altho ugh the
actor 's conduct a nd cul pa ble state of mind are the same in the two
cases, th e e xiste nce of a re sulting harm matt ers greatly in assess ing
liability an d punishme nt. T his m:tcom e confinTlS find ings in om
ri·o ;Jr··dc:
'···. ( ·;· i t i' r :i ? P th P """1.11"-,-l.tv of s··ra·te
eal-]J.eJ· stLJrii
. . _ ._ e"
u. r,r, It p ~ ov l· c: Ps bc
•
criminal codes that follow the M odel .P en al Code in grading attempts
th e same as the substJntive offen se. 67 The Code ·would have graded
the offenses in scena rios 1 and 2 the sa me. but our S 1Jbjects gave the
attem pt less th an half of th e punis hmen t of the completed offense.
A comparison of the results in scena rios 1 and 3, as well as in
scen arios 2 and 4, confirms current lmv'::; view that the actor's
culp ab ility level o ught to have a larg·:: effect on degree of li ability.
Again, these fin dings are consistent with the findin gs in differe nt
contexts found in our previous studies. 68 Intentionally causing or
trying to ca use a harm is dram atically more blameworthy than being
reckless as to causing the same harm. This norm supports current
law's grading of offenses according to culpability level, as in
homicide-intentional killing (rimrder) is grade d more seriously than
reckless killing (manslaughte r) .
But given the near uni versali ty of this rule , it also m ay be
appropriate to criticize curre nt law for limiting the use of culp a bility
levels in grading to a few serious offenses. T he results suggest that an
actor's culpa bility leve l is significan t in offenses far less serio us than
homicide. Even in the p ure property offenses tes ted here , the effect
of culpability leve l was dramatic . The intent ional burning received
more than seven times the punish ment of the reckless burning. 69
Each point on our li ability scale is equivalent to approximately one
grade in a modern A merican criminal code . T hus, if the results he re
were followed, reckless burning would be graded two grades less than
intentional burning. Current law , in contr ast, typically grades
intentional and reckless (and negligent) burning the same .70
l
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66. Sec ROB INSON & DA RLE Y, supm note 45. at st udies 1. 17.
67. See, e.g. , M ODEL PENAL CODE ~ 5.05(1): CONN. GEN. STAT. AN N. § 53A-51
(West 197 1) ; N .J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4(a) (West 1978) ; 18 PA. CONS . STAT. ANN .
§ 905(a) (Wes t 1972 & S upp. 1997) .
68. See ROB!NSON & D ARLEY , supra no te 45. at stu d ies 8, 9, 16.
69. Compare scenario 1's ten m o n ths to scen ar io 3's six weeks .
70. See, e.g., M ODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1 )(a) . G radin g d iffere nces are base d
exclusive ly on the value of the property damage d. See id. § 220 .3(2) .
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The Formulation of D efenses

The results in the contrast cases al so tell us so n1ething about
defenses. A comparison of the results in scenarios l and 6 shows
clearly that a "lesser evils defense ,,. as it is called , has strong intuitive
support among the subjects. A p lain language version of the defense
might read like this: "Yo u may act in a way th at would otherwise be
a crime if your con duc t is nec essary to avoid a more se rious harm or
evil than that cause d by yo ur co nduct. " 71 Abo ut ha lf of American
iurisdictions do not vet re co gnize such a defense .72 and manv of those
that have re cognized the
fense in one case or an o ther have
declined to codify it, leaving its availability and formulation in
doubt. 73 T he strength of intuit ive support for the defense suggests
that it ought to be fo rmally recognized through codification
everywhere.
The five test cases offer the most inmortant
new information
<
with implications for criminal law reform . A s noted in the previous
section , the results in scenario 7, as compared to scenarios 1 and 2,
suggest that the unknowingly justified actor ought to be treated as an
attempter, not as a perpetrator of a full substantive offense. H e has
in fact avoided a greater harm; there is no net harm. A n objective
formulation of justification defenses, like the one quoted in the
paragraph above, would achieve this result, for it would give a
justification defense to the unknowingly justified actor, who would
then be liable only for attempt under a provision like the Model
Penal Code's: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission
of the crime, he purposely engages in conduct which would constitute
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to
be .... " 74 Under the circumstances as the unknowingly justified
actor believes them to be, he is committing the crime; hence, he is
liable for an attempt to commit the crime.
In addition to justification defenses objectively defined, the law
must provide a defense provision governing mistake as to a
justification that would give a defense to the actor who mistakenly
believes her conduct is justified. T he results of scenario 8, as
compared to scenario 6, suggest that such a provision should be

.J
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71. Paul H. Robinson et al., ivfaking Criminal Codes Functional: A Code of Conduct
and a Code of Adjudication, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304 app. A. § 67, at 344
(1996).
72. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3. § 124. at 45 n.l (citing authorities).
73. See 2 id.
74. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 5.0l(l)(a).
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for mulated to give a comple te defense only if the actor acts for the
justificatory purpose; it ought not be enough that she simply knows of
the justifying circumstances, if these were not her renson for acting.
As not ed above, only 7.8% of our subjects gav e a defense to an actor
wh o kne w of the justifying circumstances but acted out for a
differe nt, malevolent motive . This res ul t suggests that a comp le te
defen se o ught to be given not when an act or '·belie ves her conduct is
necessa ry to avo id a thre a tened grea ter ha rm ,"' bu t on ly when she
e ngages in the offe nse conduct "in o rder ru avoid a threate ned
t C_
, .. r 1
1 ·· 1'
bo-1·e ::>
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The question re mains, however , wh e ther such an incre ased
defense rr:quirement has practical utility. It is not impossible , but
ce rtair'.ly d ifficult , for a court to know wh e th e r an actor acts for the
proper purpose. An actor who knows of the justifying circ umst ances
generally wo uld have littl e difficulty persuading a court that those
circumstances are th e source of her motivation . Further, the case in
which the justificatory purpose is not prese nt, as in scenario 8, will be
rare . A ll things considered , it may not be worth the trouble to have
the defense formul a tion distinguish between purpose and simple
bel ief.
T he real dispute in formulating the mistake-as-to-a-justification
defense is whether to allow a mitigation for an unreasonable mistake .
As noted above , the results in scenarios 10 and 11 show that our
subjects give a significant mitigation in such cases from the full
liability given in scenario 1. The current law 's majority rule , then , is
badly out of step with our subjects' views. In the case of a reckless
mistake, our subjects would give one-tenth the liability given fo r the
fu ll offe nse. 75 For a negligent mistake, our subj ects would give onetwentieth of that for the full offense. 76 Th ese are substantial
mitigations, in cases in which current law commonly gives none.
How might code drafters incorporate this mitigation approach
into defenses for mistake as to a justification? The basic defense
might read something like the following: " An actor is excused for
her conduct constituting an offense if her conduct would be justified
had the attendant circumstances been as she believed them to be. "
The effect of this provision would be to provide a mistake-as-to-ajustification excuse to a person who honestly believed her conduct to
be justified. Another provision would th en impose liability upon
those actors whose mistakes were culpable , varying the level of
75. Compare resu lts of scenarios 1 and 11.
76. Compare resul ts of scenarios 1 and 10.
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liability \vith the level of culpability of the mistake. 77 Such a
provision might provide: "When an actor is reckless or negligent in
assessing the circumstances that justify her conduct. the mistake-asto-a-justification excuse [quoted above] is not available for an offense
for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be. is sufficient
to establish liability. " 7 ~' Thus, a person who intentionally kills another
believing that such killing is justified but who is reckless in having
such a belief. would be liable only for rec k less homicide
(manslaughter), not intentional homicide (murder) . A person vvho is
negligent in so believing would be liable only for negligent
homicide. 79
C.

Reform ofAcquittal Verdict Forms

Recall the peculiar results in scenario 9, in which the actor
makes an entirely reasonable mistake, is blameless, and few subjects
imposed any significant punishment, yet only 17.3% gave the actor a
defense. If the subjects thought that no punishment is appropriate,
why would they impose liability?
One argument made in support of the deeds theory is that it
helps make a distinction that is important to effective operation of
criminal justice: the distinction between (1) conduct not punished
because it is the right thing to do, it avoids a greater harm, and we
would want it to be performed under similar circumstances in the
future, and (2) conduct not punished because, vvhile it is wrong, it
does not avoid a greater harm, and we would not vvant it pe rformed
in similar circumstances in the future, the actor in fact is blameless
for performing the wrongful conduct. Recall from the introduction
of this Article that this is the classic distinction between a
justification and an excuse. The deeds theory allows this distinction
to be made manifest by distinguishing cases of mistake as to a

77. This is the structural approach of the Model Penal Code.

See MODEL PENAL

CODE § 3.09(2).

78. This language is modeled after Model Penal Code § 3.09(2). See id. It suffers
from a number of technical problems that arc beyond the scope of this Article. See
ROBINSON, supra note I, at 463-64 (discussing these technical problems).
79. Unfortunately, this approach to drafting a mitigation provision is dependent upon
the criminal code having different culpability levels for most offenses. That is a
suggestion that we urge above. but it is not true of most modern criminal codes. When no
lesser grade for a lower culpability existed, the actor would get a complete defense under
this approach , even for a reckless mistake. That would be a very undesirable result.
Another approach. not dependent on the proper structuring of offense definitions. would
give a set mitigation (for example, one offense grade-for a reckless mistake) and a
greater mitigation (two offense grades) for a negligent mistake.
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justification from cases of objective justificacion. labeling the former
excuses and only the iatter justifications.
Under this appro ach , an actor acquitted under a justification
defense provides an example to others of conduct that they are free
to repeat in similar circumstances in the future. An actor excused
under a mistake-as-to-a-justification e xcuse . in contrast, provides an
example to others of con d uct that they ought not perform in similar
circumstances in the future. The actor is being acquitted despite her
wrongful conduct. The reasons theory. by combining truly justified
conduct wi th mistak e as to a jLtstification. te rming both "justified, "
makes it impossible to rnake this distinction.
This tension benvee n judging the acto r an d judging t he act may
well have influenced our subjects in scenario 9, in which 71.2% gave
the actor essentially no punishment-either no liability, liability but
no punishment, or one clay imprisonment, which might have been
seen as a symbolic gesture. 81 1 If no punishment is the strong majority
view of the gro up, why d id only 17.3% give the complete defense
verdict of " not guilty," thus imposing no liability at all? They may
well have been concerned about the precedential effect of such
outright acquittals, the message that it would send to others. Would
it be taken to weaken the prohibition against such burnings
generally?
That is certainly a danger in a system like the current one, which
does not distinguish betvveen justified conduct, which the law is
happy to have repeated by others in similar circumstances. and
excused conduct, which the law does not want repeated. Both cases
are acquitted under current practice with the same verdict, "not
guilty."
If the only choice availa ble is "not guilty," with no
justification or excuse distinction, jurors are likely to feel
uncomfortable acquitting in cases of excuse, for fear of the ease with
which the verdict can be misunderstood. On the other hand, they
also would fe el uncomfortable exposing a person they thought
blameless to substantial punishment with a "guilty" verdict. 81
We offered our subjects a way out of this dilemma, and they
embraced it. They were offered a choice of "liability but no
punishment," which gave them the opportunity to avoid punishing a
blameless actor but also to condemn the conduct as something that

80. Of all the subjects, 86.5% fit into these three categories for the contrast case of
actual justified burning.
81. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE ;\ND FUNCnm.,: IN CRIMINAL LAW 146-48
(1997).
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While this approetch is ci usefu l re search device and has revealed
interesting informa rion, H is no c a solution to the practical prob lem in
real life, for juries have little role in the sentencing process. Once
they give a verdict of '' li ability" of any sort, it is for the court to
sentence. T he offense
-vvhich the jury convicts sets a statutory
maximum above '>Nhi
:sentenci ng judge cannot go. but, unless
they give a defense.
cann ot othervvise assure that the actor will
get no punishment o r on syrnbolic punishment , as our study allows
its subjects . F urthel·.
" lia bility bm no punishment " option has the
disadvantage of imposing · bility on a blameless defendant. 1n the
re al world, where crimi
con viction can bring moral condemnation
and stigmatization, as well as other collateral disadvantages in jobs,
licensing, and the iike, such li ability is unfair. Thus, even if jurors had
sentencing power, this solution to the problem-liability with no
punishment-has the effect of imposing the condemnation and
stigma of criminal conviction on a blameless offender who does not
deserve it. vVe force jurors between the two bad choices of doing
injustice or undermining the prohibition against such conduct in the
future.
The better resolution is to recognize formally distinct acquittal
verdicts of "justified" and " excused," in which the former approves of
the actor's conduct and the latter disapproves of it. An objectively
justified actor receives a verdict of "justified," thereby approving of
the conduct, while the actor •.vho mistakenly believes she is justified is
"excused," thereby disapproving of the conduct. One of us has
elsewhere offered the dewils for such a verdict system.s2
V I. CONCLUSIONS

The results reported here illustrate the potential usefulness of
social science research for illuminating iss ues concerning the
formulation of criminal codes . If the code drafters are interested in
knowing the moral intuitions of the community that the codes will
govern , then the sort of careful, empirical social science study of the
sort conducted here is the oreferred
mechanism for discovering'--' those
>
intuitions. Properly constructed studies can resolve competing claims
among criminallav.; theorists over which theory or rule better accords
with people's intuitions of justice. H ere we conclude that the deeds
theory of justification better accords with community views than does
the reasons theory.
S2. See id. at 204-07.
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Furthe r. such st udi es also 2:ene rate soec ific r::::fo rm Drocosals that
wo uld ma ke the criminal justice system m ore just in its ope r ation.
T he re sults in this study sugges t a refo rmul ation of many aspects of
offense defi ni tions, reforms to justification defenses and mitiga tions
for mistak e as to a justifica tion , and reforms of j ury acqu ittal verdicts.
O n ou r e xamin ation, and, we hop e, on the re ader 's exa min ation,
these sugge st ions for refo rm appear cohere nt and are ones that
adequat e ly balance the compe ting consi dera tion s th at go vern
judgments ab out these difficult cases in which the rt~aso n for c.n d th e
o utcome of th e perpetrator 's acts are in con flict. T hey are, in othe r
\vo rds. reas onable candidates fo r cod e adop tion . Refo rm s of this
so rt, that bring cri min al law' s principles of justice clo ser to those of
the community, we argue, increase the law·s moral cre dibility , which
in turn increases its long-term effectiveness in crime control.
~
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APPENDIX: STEviULUS STORIES

As we all know, in different circumstan ces, some actions can
generate crirnin al li abili ty while very similar o th ers do not. Be low
are a number of cases in which a person se ts a fire, for a num be r of
diffe rent reasons , and under a number of diffe rent circumstances.
Y our task is to judge wh e the r the act , in each of the speci fi e stori es
that you read, sho uld co unt as an offense ge nerating crimin a l !iJbility
D r not. If vou decide th at it is a offense that shou ld ._.,
g:e ne r <1te liabilitv.
.,
you will th en assign it a punishment of whatever magnitude mak es
sense to you, or you may de cide that even though it is a crimin ai act ,
you want to assign it n o punishment.
Here is hov; you will register your judgments. You \.vill z:t!ways
make your judgment by responding to the scale th at we furni sh below
each case . Glance at the sample scale just belO\.V this paragraph now.
After yo u read a specific scenario . circle "N" if yo u think the person
has committed something that ordinarily would be considered a
crime , but he has a n acceptable justification fo r what he did and so
should get no criminal liability. Circle "0" if you think the person
has done something that generates crimin al li a bility but should not
receive any punishm ent. Otherwise choose a sentence from the other
o ptions. vVork thro ugh the set of cases , giving us your opinionsthere a re no ri ght an swers. Take as much time as yo u need to go
through the set of cases. (The numbers in front of each scenario are
random, and simply te ll us the source of the scen a rio. Ignore th em .)
Background Information for all of the scenarios.
Jake is a farmer who has already harves ted his corn crop. His
neighbor has not done so, so his three acres of corn is still in the
fie lds. The corn crop m a kes the differe nce, for these farmers.
between having a profitable season because they have winter feed for
their animals , or going into debt.
Running around seve ral sides of I ake a nd his neighbor 's fields
are dirt roads. Jake ·s farm and his neighbor's farm ar e on a n eck of
land that stretches out into a lake. Out on the end of the neck of land
is the local town. Jake's neighbor's fi elds cut the tovvn off from the
mainland, but Jake's fie ld s do not. The following map shows you this
layo ut.
(See FIGURE 1.]
Now read the stories. Please circle the rating that corresponds
with YOUR OPINION about what the appropriate sentence (if any)
sho uld be for Jake in each case. These cases will differ slightly, so it
,)

'

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

1138

[Vol. 76

is important that you read the entire case before making a judgment
about sentencing. If you think that the difference between two
scenarios is important, you shouid assign different amounts of
punishment to Jake as a result of that difference. But you may find
some differences between scenarios to be unimportant, in terms of
the amount of punishment, and it is quite all right if you assign them
the same amount of punishment.
Some people have trouble thinking about punishments in terms
of prison sentences. Our real question to you is what punishment
Jake deserves for the act he committed, using the scale as a vehicle to
express your beliefs. So you may want to think about the amount of
punishment you think the act deserves as equivalent to a prison
sentence of a particular length, and then assign that length sentence.
For example, you may think a two-week prison sentence is equivalent
to a $10,000 fine, and hence circle a "2" to indicate that relative
amount of punishment.
After reading and assigning a sentence to a later case, you might
want to change your punishment ratings of one or more previous
cases. You are free to do so. Remember, we are interested in
knowing the liability and sentence YOU THINK SHOULD BE
ASSIGNED in each case: there are no right and wrong answers and
your responses will be kept completely confidential.

1. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that his
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn.
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, and there is no
wind, it is clear that the burning will create no danger beyond that of
destroying the corn. The fire destroys the entire crop.
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2. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that his
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn.
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, and there is no
wind, it is clear that the burning will create no danger beyond that of
destroying the corn. Just as Jake sets the fire, the neighbor
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unexpectedly returns and puts it out before it does any harm.
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3. Like all of the local farmers. Jake routinely piles dry
cornhusks near where the y Z~re cut and eventually burns them. Jake
has one such pile near his neighbor"s fields. Jake wants to get the pile
burned quickly; the previous yea r he waited and the pile got soaked
by rain. H e is aware that high winds are forecast for today; winds
that create a real risk that his fir e will jump the gap between his trash
pile and his neighbor 's corn fi elds. Despite this danger, Jake burns
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop.
The winds come and the fire jumps to his neighbor's crop. The fire
destroys the entire crop.
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4. Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry
cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns them. Jake
has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. J ake wants to get the pile
burned quickly; the previous year he waited and the pile got soaked
by rain. He is aware that high winds are forecast for today; winds
that create a real risk that his fire will jump the gap between his trash
pile and his neighbor's corn fields. Despite this danger, Jake burns
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop.
The winds come but, J ake is lucky, the fire does not jump to his
neighbor's crop.
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Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry
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cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns them. J ake
has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. Jake ·wants to get the pile
burned quickly: the previous year he waited and the pile got soak ed
by rain. He is aware that high winds are fo recast for today: winds
that create a real risk that his fire will jump th e gap be tween his trash
pile and his neighbor's corn fields. Despite th is danger, Jake burns
his trash pile, hoping the fir e will not jump to his m;ighbor's crop. It
turns out that the weather forecast wa s in ::rror about the wind .
Jake's burning never creates any danger to his neighbor's field.
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6. Jake hears over his Citizen 's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor 's fie lds and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering
the people who live there.
He can see the smoke from the
approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor's corn
crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire . (Remember that
Jake 's own field is not located where it could serve as a firebreak.)
J ake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission,
and he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop. Because of
his quick work the town and its inhabitants are saved.
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7. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a disp ute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. Vv'hen he knows that his
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighb or's three acres of corn.
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, it is clear that
the burning will create no danger beyond that of destroying the
neighbor's corn. The fire destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to
Jake, lightning has started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor 's
fields and the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and
endangering the people who live there. H is burning the field creates
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a firebreak: The town and its inh abitants are saved.
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8. Jake hears ove r his C itizen ·s Band radio that lightn in g bas
:)tarted a fire upwi nd from his and his ne ighbor's fields and the local
town ancl that th e fire is b urning toward the town and endangering
the people who live there.
He can see th e smo ke from the
approaching fire and calcu lates that if he burns his neighbor' s corn
crop he can create a firebr eak that will stop the fire. (Re memb er that
Jake 's own field is no t loca ted where it could serve as a firebreak.)
J ake ha s no interest in saving the town ; th e townspeople have always
been unfriendly to him. F urther , Jake is angry with his neighbor over
a dispute about use of water from a creek that the two share. He
decides to use the fire as an excuse to burn his neighbor's corn crop.
Without asking his neighbor for permission, he burns the fields. The
fire destroys the entire crop. Because of his quick work the town and
its inhabitants are saved.
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9. Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
sta rted a fire upwind from his and his neigh bo r's fie lds and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the tow n and endangerin g
the people who li ve there. In the past, Citizen's Band radio reports
have often been true, but also often false. Jake stops two cars th a t
are racing into town , and both confirm that " there is a big, out of
control fire, headin g this way." (Any reasonab le person would think
there was a destructive fire coming.) Jake can see the smoke from
the approaching fir e and calculates that if he burns his neighbor 's
corn crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire .
(Remember that Jake's own field is not loca ted where it could serve
as a firebreak.) Jake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask
for permission, and he burns the fields. T he fire destroys the en tire

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

1142

[V ol. 76

crop. It turns o ut th at the radio report was in erro r. The sm oke \Vas
from a con troll ed burn being cl one by a crew of loca l foresters and
presented no dange r to th e town or an y of the surrounding are a.
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10. Jake hears ove r his Citize n's Band radio that light ning has
started a fire upw in d from his and hi s neighbor's field s and th e local
town and that the fire is burning toward th e town and e nd angerin g
the people who live th ere. In th e past, Citizen's Band radi o reports
have often be e n tru e. but also often false. J a ke doesn ' t think of this,
and although a reasonable person would do so, J ake d oes n't think to
check on th e truth of the report , but there is no doubt in his mind
that it is a d angerous fire. Jake can see th e smoke from th e
approaching fir e and calculates that if he burns his neighbor 's corn
crop he can create a fire break th a t will stop the fir e . (Re member that
Jake 's own fi eld is not loca ted where it could serve as a fir eb reak .)
Jake knows th at his neighbor is not available to ask for permission,
and he burns the fi eld s. The fir e destroys the entire crop. It turns out
that the radio report was in error. The smoke was from a controlled
burn being clon e by a crew of local for esters and presented n o danger
to the town or any of the surrounding area.
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11. Jake hears over his Citizen 's Band radio that lightning has
started a fir e upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangerin g
the people wh o live there. In the past, Citizen's Band radio repo rts
have often been true , but also often false. Jake remembers this fact ,
and realizes there might not be a dangerous fire, but doesn't check on
th e truth of th e report. He can see th e sm oke fr om the approaching
fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor 's corn crop he can
create a fire break th at will stop the fir e. (Remember that Jake's own
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fie ld is not located whe re it could serve as a firebreak .) Jake knows
that his neighbor is not avail able to ask for pe rmission, and he burns
the fie lds. The fire destroys the entire crop. It turns out that the
radio report was in error. The smoke was from a controlled burn
being done by a crew of loca l fores ters and presented no dange r to
th e town or any of th e surro unding area.
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